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We consider a dynamic two-period model where two ￿rms o⁄er products
that are di⁄erentiated a la Hotelling. Consumers purchase products in a ￿rst
period, and in a second period consumers are locked-in to their ￿rst-period
choice of producer with a switching cost. In the second period ￿rms are
able to price discriminate based on consumers purcase history from period
1. We show that i) ￿rms will approach their rival￿ s customers by low prices
in the second period (customer poaching) and that ine¢ cient switching will
occur, ii) second-period prices are dependent on ￿rst-period market shares,
a result in contrast to some of the received literature. Finally, iii) with high
enough switching costs ￿rst-period prices is below the level in a static setting,
and more so the higher the switching costs and the more di⁄erentiated the
products are.1 Introduction
If ￿rms can observe past behavior of potential customers and arbitrage is
infeasible among customers ￿rms may price discriminate based on purchase
history. For instance, if a ￿rm can observe whether a potential customer was
a previous customer of his ￿rm or a rival, ￿rms may o⁄er discounts to new
customers to make these customers switch. Examples of such price discrim-
ination are abundant. For instance, in the Telecom industry Schwarz (1997)
reports that 20% of all US household switched long-distance provider in 1994
and in the years that followed many providers o⁄ered one-time bonuses to
the switchers.
Received literature on this topic has analyzed this issue in speci￿c models
of imperfect competition. The two most commonly used models are Hotelling
models of product di⁄erentiation (Villas-Boas (1999)1 and Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000)) and models with switching costs (Chen (1997) and Taylor
(2003)). The results from this literature will be reviewed in more detail be-
low, but already at this point it is noteworthy that the results are heavily
dependent on the assumptions made regarding the underlying competitive
mode between ￿rms. Chen (1997) and Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) use
two-period models where ￿rms acquire customers in a ￿rst period and the
in second period ￿rms may observe whether potential customers previously
bought from them or the rival ￿rm. Villas-Boas (1999) has in￿nitely lived
￿rms with overlapping generations of consumers, and Taylor (2003) has a
multiperiod model where a consumer￿ s switching cost vary from period to
period. In all articles ￿rms can recognize customers and can price discrimi-
nate by o⁄ering previous customers of the rival ￿rms lower prices than own
previous customers.
In Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) ￿rms are di⁄erentiated a la Hotelling and
a central result is that ￿rst-period prices are higher than in the corresponding
static model. In Chen (1997) products are ex ante homogeneous, but becomes
ex post di⁄erentiated due to switching costs. In contrast to the ￿ndings of
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) ￿rst-period prices in Chen (1997) are lower than
in the corresponding static model. Hence, predictions rely heavily on the
speci￿c modelling of imperfect competition. A central aim with the present
paper is bridge some of the gap between these two approaches by building
a model that take into account that products may be both ex ante and ex
post di⁄erentiated. The present model assumes that producers o⁄ers ex ante
di⁄erentiated products (in a Hotelling style model) and that in addition to
this products become ex post di⁄erentiated due to switching costs in the
1See also Villas-Boas (2001).
1second period.
Before we present our results it may be worthwhile to examine in some-
what more detail the assumptions and results from the received literature.
Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) have a duopoly where ￿rms are located on each
endpoint of a Hotelling line. Firms compete in two periods with no switching
costs in the second period. The results are that ￿rms price discriminate in
the second period and a positive fraction of consumers do switch (customer
poaching). The switching is socially wasteful since some of the consumers
switches from their preferred brand to a less preferred one in the second pe-
riod. Since consumers realize that they will be approached by a rival with
discounts in the second period, ￿rst-period demand becomes less elastic. This
tends to raise ￿rst-period prices so as to make the equilibrium ￿rst-period
prices higher than in the static model. Hence, the ability to price discrimi-
nate is bene￿cial for the ￿rms. Villas-Boas (1999) also studies a linear city
duopoly with customer recognition, but he assumes that ￿rms are in￿nitely
lived while demand is derived from overlapping generations of consumers who
live for two periods.
Chen (1997) uses a homogeneous good model where products become ex
post di⁄erentiated by a uniformly distributed switching cost. Firms compete
in two periods where ￿rst the ￿rms set prices and consumers choose which
product to buy. Then, in the beginning of the second period, consumers learn
their switching costs and ￿rms o⁄er prices to own customers and poaching
prices. Some customers will switch in equilibrium, and due to the switching
costs this switching is also socially wasteful. Moreover, as is usual in models
with switching costs (see Klemperer (1995) for an overview over the switching
costs literature2) ￿rst-period prices are lower than in the corresponding static
model. In Chen￿ s model ￿rst-period prices are in fact lower than marginal
costs. The reason is that ￿rms compete harshly for customers that they will
exploit in the second period when they are locked-in. Taylor (2003) extends
Chen￿ s model in several ways. Taylor (2003) considers a multiperiod model
where ￿rms produce homogeneous products and consumers incur switching
costs, but where switching costs may vary from period to period.
Of particular interest in Chen (1997) is how a ￿rm￿ s market share a⁄ects
its pricing behavior. This issue is interesting ￿ ... not only because it sheds
light on price competition in a mature market where each ￿rm has established
a market share, but also because it can have implications for consumer de-
mand and the price competition in a new market...￿(Chen (1997), p 878).
A central ￿nding in Chen (1997) is that the equilibrium second-period prices
of the ￿rms are independent of ￿rst-period market shares. A similar result is
2See also Nilssen (1992) and Wang and Wen (1998).
2also obtained by Taylor (2003). In this paper we show that the independence
result found in the received literature is not robust to introducing product
di⁄erentiation into a model with switching costs. By introducing only a small
amount of (ex ante) product di⁄erentiation in addition to switching costs,
the independence result evaporates.
The model we use is one where ￿rms are located at each end of a Hotelling
line and where consumers who bought from one ￿rm in the ￿rst period must
incur switching costs if they wish to switch to the second ￿rm in period
two. Firms choose prices in period one and customers choose where to buy.
Given this, ￿rms o⁄er second-period prices where they can price discrimi-
nate between consumers based on purchase history. As in Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000) and Chen (1997) a positive fraction of consumers switches in
equilibrium. This switching is socially wasteful for two reasons: First, some
consumers switch to their least preferred brand in the second-period, and
second they incur switching costs.
In contrast to the ￿nding in Chen (1997), we show that second-period
(the mature market) prices now depend on ￿rst-period market shares. Prices
to own customers are increasing in market share, but poaching prices are in-
versely related to market shares. That prices to own customers is increasing
is market share is what we should expect, but as noted above, it contradicts
the independence result found in Chen (1997) and also in Taylor (2003).
More surprising is the fact that poaching prices are inversely related to mar-
ket shares, i.e. a ￿rm with a high market share in the mature market will
o⁄er huge discounts to new customers. The intuition is that with product
di⁄erentiation a ￿rm with a large market share must try to attract customers
with strong underlying preferences for the rival brand. The larger a market
share a ￿rm has, the larger is the average brand preference of the rival ￿rm￿ s
customers for this ￿rm￿ s brand. Hence, poaching prices is decreasing in a
￿rm￿ s market share.
When switching costs in our model are high enough relative to the brand
preferences of the consumers, ￿rst-period prices exhibit the well-known fea-
tures of switching costs models, i.e. they are lower that the static prices.
However, in the present model this result is not trivial as Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000) found that absent switching costs ￿rst-period prices is indeed
higher than the static prices. Product di⁄erentiation tends to push ￿rst-
period prices up, and switching costs tend to push ￿rst-period prices down.
When switching costs are high enough, the latter e⁄ect dominates.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic
features of our model and brie￿ y reviews the result from the static linear city
model. The main section, Section 3, solves the dynamic model with switching
costs in a linear city. Section 4 concludes and points at some directions for
3further research.
2 The model
There are two ￿rms denoted by i = A;B that are di⁄erentiated in a Hotelling
sense. Each ￿rm is located at each end of the unit interval and consumers
are uniformly distributed along the interval. Firm A is located at x = 0 and
￿rm B is located at x = 1: Firms have constant marginal production costs
equal to c:
Consumers have unit demand and derives gross utility v from consump-
tion of the good, and incur a linear transportation cost t per unit of distance.
Throughout the paper we will assume that v is su¢ ciently large so that all
consumers will buy. Hence, a consumer located in address x incurs trans-
portation costs tx if buying from ￿rm A and t(1 ￿ x) if buying the good of
￿rm B:
There are two periods. In period 1 ￿rms A and B announce prices a and
b; respectively, and consumers choose where to buy. Consumers get locked-
in to their ￿rst-period supplier with a switching cost s that is uniformly
distributed on [0;￿]: The distribution of switching costs is independent of
consumers￿distribution on the unit interval.
In the second-period we will assume that ￿rms are able to identify cus-
tomers based on their purchase record in period 1. Alternatively, one could
also assume that second-period customers are all anonymous to the produc-
ers, but this case is not considered here. With customer recognition ￿rms can
price discriminate between customers that previously bought their product
and customers of the rival ￿rm. By lowering the price to ￿ new￿customers,
￿rms may be able to poach some share of the rival￿ s customers.
Therefore, with customers recognition each ￿rm A and B o⁄er prices ￿
and ￿ to customers that bought from them in period 1, and prices ￿2 and ￿2
to customers that bought from the rival ￿rm in period one (￿ poaching prices￿ ).
Thus, ￿2 is the price o⁄ered by ￿rm A to the customers that bought from
￿rm B in period 1, and ￿2 is the price o⁄ered by ￿rm B to the consumers
that bought product A in period 1. All ￿rms and consumers use a common
discount rate of ￿:
As a point of reference we ￿rst brie￿ y review the standard solution to the
static Hotelling model without switching costs, i.e. the case when there are
no second period. When ￿rms o⁄er prices a and b the marginal consumer
4located in x is characterized by:
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and by solving these we have:
Proposition 1 In the static model without switching costs the equilibrium
prices are a = b = c + t:
With symmetric prices, ￿rms split the market in half. When t approaches
zero, the market approaches a market with homogeneous products and the
well-known Bertrand paradox appears with marginal cost pricing. Let us
now focus on the more interesting part, namely the dynamic model where
products are di⁄erentiated and customers learn their switching costs in the
beginning of the second period.
3 The dynamic model
The dynamic model is solved by investigating the second-period pricing prob-
lem for the two producers given their inherited market shares from the ￿rst
period, and then solving the ￿rst-period pricing problem. Let k be the in-
herited market share for ￿rm A from period 1 and 1 ￿ k the equivalent for
￿rm B:
3.1 Second-period poaching
When customers can be recognized, ￿rms may price discriminate between
own and new customers. Let qij denote the share of consumers who bought
5from ￿rm j previously but buy from ￿rm i in the second period. A consumer
who bought from ￿rm A in the ￿rst period will be indi⁄erent between con-
tinuing to do so and switching to buying from ￿rm B if her switching cost is
such that
v ￿ tx ￿ ￿ = v ￿ t(1 ￿ x) ￿ ￿2 ￿ sA
m
sA(x) = t(2x ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ ￿2)
Similarly, a consumer who bought from ￿rm B in the ￿rst period will be
indi⁄erent between continuing to do so and switching to buying from ￿rm A
if her switching cost is such that
v ￿ t(1 ￿ x) ￿ ￿ = v ￿ tx ￿ ￿2 ￿ sB
m
sB(x) = t(1 ￿ 2x) + ￿ ￿ ￿2
The function sA(x) is increasing in x and sB(x) is decreasing in x; and
both functions are linear in x: We assume conditions su¢ cient that the in-
di⁄erent consumer between continuing to buy from his previous supplier and
switching to his rival is at an interior x for all ￿; i.e. sA(0) ￿ 0;sB(1) ￿ 0:
This is termed horizontal dominance (see Anderson, 2003) and means that
sA(x) 2 [0;k] and sB(x) 2 [1 ￿ k;1] in the neighborhood of the solutions
sought for all s 2 [0;￿]: For now, assume that all three inequalities hold.3
In this case we can compute the share of A0s previous customers that
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Then we can ￿nd the share of A0s previous customers that switches to B
in the second period as qBA = k ￿ qAA
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3This will of course be checked in our optimal solution.
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(1 ￿ k)(￿ ￿ tk ￿ ￿2)
￿
and then the fraction that leaves ￿rm B to ￿rm A is given by
qAB = (1 ￿ k) ￿
￿
1 ￿ k ￿




(1 ￿ k)(￿ ￿ tk ￿ ￿2)
￿
Now the overall second period pro￿ts for the ￿rms ￿2i are given by
￿2A = (￿ ￿ c)qAA + (￿2 ￿ c)qAB
￿2B = (￿ ￿ c)qBB + (￿2 ￿ c)qBA
Firm A earns pro￿t in the second period from the customers that stay with
￿rm A in both period and the customers that switch from ￿rm B in the second
period. Similarly, ￿rm B earns pro￿t from the stayers and the switchers from
￿rm A: When inserting for the demands above we have:




(￿ + t(1 ￿ k) ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿2))
￿
+ (￿2 ￿ c)
￿
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￿
￿
￿2B = (￿ ￿ c)
￿
1 ￿ k ￿
(1 ￿ k)(￿ ￿ tk ￿ ￿2)
￿
￿




(tk + ￿ ￿ t ￿ ￿2)
￿
Maximizing these pro￿t expression with respect to prices ￿ and ￿2 for ￿rm
A and ￿ and ￿2 for ￿rm B yields the following result
Proposition 2 Given a market share k from period 1 for ￿rm A and (1￿k)
for ￿rm B the second-period prices ￿ and ￿ and the poaching prices ￿2 and
7￿2 are given by
￿(k) = c +
1
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and solving these yields the prices in the proposition.
In contrast to Chen (1997) we see that second-period prices depend on
￿rst-period market share. A central ￿nding in Chen (1997) is that equilibrium
prices in the mature market (the second period) of both ￿rms are independent
of their respective market shares. The latter is true in Chen￿ s model only
when ￿rms can price discriminate between own and the rival￿ s customers.4
When ￿rms are unable to price discriminate and must o⁄er all customers the
same prices in the mature market, Chen (1997) shows that higher market
shares inherited from period one will indeed raise prices in the mature market.
From our model where we have both ex ante product di⁄erentiation and ex
post switching costs we see that the result of market share dependent prices
is restored also in the case where ￿rms can price discriminate in the mature
market.
The prices obtained by Chen (1997) will appear also here by setting t = 0:
With homogeneous products and switching costs, second-period prices are
independent of ￿rst-period market share (the independence result). When
t > 0 for either ￿rm, a higher market share from period 1 will increase his
price to own customers and lower his poaching price. The intuition is that
the transportation costs adds to the switching costs born by the customers
and therefore make them less reluctant to switch. Consequently, the locked-
in customers may be exploited more and the rival ￿rm￿ s customers must be
4Chen (2000) denotes this as PCTS, short for ￿ Paying customers to switch￿ . Alter-
natively, ￿rms are unable to price discriminate in the mature market, a case denoted as
UNIF.
8o⁄ered a lower poaching price to induce switching. The higher market share
a ￿rm has from period 1, the stronger these e⁄ects are.
One may therefore wonder what the exact reason is for the di⁄erences
in results in our model and Chen (1997). As noted by Chen (1997) the
independence result is somewhat surprising. Normally, under the existence
of switching costs large ￿rms tends to exploit locked-in consumers more than
smaller ￿rms. This is exactly what is happening in our model, a ￿rm with
a larger inherited market share from the ￿rst period, will set a high price
to its locked-in customers. Hence, the independence result in Chen (1997)
only holds when products are ex ante homogeneous. Moreover, the ￿rms￿
poaching prices are decreasing in market shares. The higher market share a
￿rm has, the lower price it o⁄ers to the rival ￿rm￿ s customers. The intuition
is the following: The higher market share a ￿rm has, the more likely it is
that the rival ￿rm will have acquired customers from period that have strong
underlying preferences for that product. To put it di⁄erently, the higher
market share ￿rm A has, the higher will the average transportation cost of
￿rm B￿ s customers be to ￿rm A￿ s location. In order to attract these customers
￿rm A must therefore lower its poaching price, and more so the higher A￿ s
market share.










￿2tk￿ + 2tk2￿ + t2k2 ￿ 4￿2 + 3k￿2 ￿ t2k
￿
We now turn to the ￿rst-period pricing problem where ￿rms set prices antic-
ipating the consequences for the second-period outcome.
3.2 First-period pricing
As noted above A0s ￿rst period price is a and B0s is b: If ￿rst-period prices
lead to a cuto⁄ k￿ 2 (0;1) we must have that type k￿ is indi⁄erent between
buying good A in period 1 at a and then buying B in period 2 at the poaching
price ￿2; or buying B in period 1 at price b and then buying A at the poaching
















9However, as shown in Proposition 2 the second-period poaching prices are
also functions of ￿rst-period market shares. Inserting the optimal second-
period poaching prices from Proposition 2 in the expression for k￿ above and
then solving for k gives the cuto⁄ market share in period one as function of











Firm A0s overall maximization problem then becomes:
max
a ￿A = max
a (a ￿ c)k
￿(a;b) + ￿￿2A(k
￿(a;b))





(b ￿ c)(1 ￿ k
￿(a;b)) + ￿￿2B(k
￿(a;b))
Solving the two maximization problems above and solving for the equilibrium
prices yields the following result:
Proposition 3 For ￿ ￿ 2t; k￿ = 1
2and
a = b = c + t ￿
1
3
￿ (￿ + 2t)














constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium.










and solving these yields
a = b = c + t ￿
1
3
￿ (￿ + 2t)




























Finally we must check that we are in the relevant case, i.e. sA(0) ￿ 0;sB(1) ￿
0 and si(1
2) ￿ ￿: Inserting the equilibrium prices yields
sA(0) = t(2x ￿ 1) + (￿ ￿ ￿2) ￿ 0 () 2t ￿ ￿















Hence, ￿ ￿ 2t is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for being in our case.
We see that ￿rst-period prices are below the prices in the static model.
Note that @a
@t = @b
@t = 1 ￿ 2
3￿ > 0; i.e. more product di⁄erentiation tends to
rise ￿rst-period prices. Moreover @a
@￿ = @b
@￿ = ￿1
3￿ < 0; i.e. higher switching
costs tend to decrease ￿rst-period prices. In equilibrium, and when switching
costs are su¢ ciently high (￿ ￿ 2t); the e⁄ect from switching costs dominates,
yielding equilibrium prices below the static level. Also, we observe that for
t = 0 (homogeneous products) we are back in Chen￿ s (1997) model.
In the second period both product di⁄erentiation and switching costs in-
crease the price that ￿rm o⁄ers to their own customers. This illustrates the
conceptual similarities between switching costs and transportation costs once
the customers have chosen a product. The e⁄ects from higher transporta-
tion and higher switching costs on the poaching prices are however opposite.
Intuitively, higher transportation costs tend to lower poaching prices. The
reason is that with higher transportation costs customers become more at-
tached to their preferred brand and must be o⁄ered a lower price to switch.
Here switching costs works the opposite way; more switching costs tend to
increase the poaching prices. This may at ￿rst sight seem very surprising.
Note however that the prices o⁄ered to own customers increases faster than
the poaching prices when switching costs increase, hence the discount o⁄ered
to the rival ￿rm￿ s customers actually increase when switching costs increase.
This result is in line with the ￿ndings in Chen (1997).
114 Concluding remarks
Price discrimination based on customer recognition has received scarce atten-
tion in economic literature. The last few years some important contributions
have emerged, but this is still an area of research with signi￿cant potential.
In going through the relatively scarce literature on this topic we have pointed
at some of the perceived problems. First of all it is noted that for price dis-
crimination to be feasible, ￿rms need to identify di⁄erent consumers with
di⁄erent demand elasticities. In this literature the ability to recognize cus-
tomers based on previous purchases has been the key element in this respect.
Two main avenues have been pursued. The ￿rst one is that consumers may
have heterogeneous preferences, and that once these preferences are revealed
￿rms can approach customers that have revealed weak preferences for their
product with lower prices. The second avenue is that ￿rms are ex ante iden-
tical for consumers, but become ex post di⁄erentiated due to switching costs
once consumers have purchased one of the products.
We have shown that these two approaches lead to very di⁄erent predic-
tions with respect to how the equilibrium price structure would look like,
and what the implications are for ￿rms and consumers. This paper is the
￿rst attempt that we are aware of that aims at bridging some of the gap
between the two approaches by explicitly taking into account both the pos-
sibility of heterogeneous preferences and the possibility that there may be
costs involved for the consumers by switching between di⁄erent suppliers.
By doing this we are able to gain some important new insights on how
the di⁄erent forces work in determining the equilibrium price structure and
the pro￿tability of this type of price discrimination. This enables us to make
testable predictions on how the price structure should depend on factors
such as di⁄erentiation, the degree of switching costs and ￿rm size in mature
markets. Still, we would like to stress this article only constitute one modest
step in achieving this goal, and that there are still many avenues to pursue.
We have conducted the analysis assuming that switching costs are suf-
￿ciently high relative to the di⁄erentiation of the products o⁄ered by the
two producers. The main argument for doing this is that our model is well
behaved under this assumption. Of course it would also be interesting to
analyze the case with low switching costs. In this case we conjecture that
our results would resemble more and more the ones obtained by Fudenberg
and Tirole (2000). However, a formal analysis of this issue is left for future
research.
Also, it would be interesting to analyze the case of anonymous consumers
in the second period in our model. If so, second-period price discrimination
would be infeasible and all customers would have to be o⁄ered the same
12prices. However, with both product di⁄erentiation and switching costs our
model becomes fairly intractable, but it should in principle be possible to
solve our model under this assumption. We are currently working along
these lines and hopefully the results from this case will appear in the near
future.
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